Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins Revisited: The Supreme Court\u27s Dismissal of Adams v. Florida Power Corps by Manning, Cassaundra L.
Comments
HAZEN PAPER Co. V. BIGGINS REVISITED: THE




In April of 2002, the Supreme Court dismissed Adams v. Florida
Power Corp.,' once again leaving unanswered the question of whether the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)2 permits disparate impact
claims. The Court previously left this issue unresolved in 1993 by
remanding Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins3 without deciding the issue of
whether disparate impact theory liability is available under the ADEA.
Consequently, there is a circuit court split regarding the applicability of
disparate impact claims to the ADEA.
Walter Biggins, a sixty-two year old employee of the Hazen Paper
Company, sued after being fired just weeks shy of the date on which his
pension would vest.4 He filed suit under the ADEA alleging that his age
was a determinative factor in Hazen's decision to terminate him.5 Hazen
claimed that Biggins was discharged for engaging in business with Hazen's
competitors.' The district court found for the plaintiff on the ADEA claim
and the holding was affirmed by the court of appeals.7 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether an employer's interference with an
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1. Adams v. Florida Power Corp., 535 U.S. 228 (2002).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
3. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
4. Id. at 606.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 607.
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employee's pension benefits vesting is violative of the ADEA.
On the surface, the interference with pension benefits may not appear
to be an age discrimination issue. In fact, courts have been in disagreement
over seniority being a proxy for age.8 However, since pension eligibility is
determined by the number of years an employee has worked for a particular
employer, pension is "empirically correlated with age."9  Termination
purely based on age is a blatant violation of the ADEA and accordingly, the
Supreme Court remanded the case, allowing the district court to properly
determine Hazen's motivation for firing Biggins. °
Interestingly, Biggins did not assert a disparate impact claim under the
ADEA. Biggins' allegation was a pure disparate treatment claim."
Despite the asserted claim being under a disparate treatment theory, this
case contributed to the circuit court split and the academic debate over the
availability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA. The Court
proclaimed, "we have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of
liability is available under the ADEA ... and we need not do so here."' 2
The facts of Adams are divergent from those of Hazen in that in the
former, the plaintiff class was alleging disparate impact theory liability
under the ADEA.1 3  The plaintiffs claimed that the Florida Power
Corporation's reorganization scheme disproportionately and adversely
affected older employees. 14  While the district court first certified the
plaintiff class, it later decertified the class, maintaining that the individual
claims were too dissimilar to proceed as a class. It then allowed
individual plaintiffs to file claims, but found that the ADEA precludes
8. Id. at 608-09. The Court noted this in its discussion of precedent in Hazen:
Compare White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 62 (CA3 1988)
(firing of older employee to prevent vesting of pension benefits violates
ADEA); Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202 (CA7 1987) (firing of older
employee to save salary costs resulting from seniority violates ADEA), with
Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 130, n.17 (CA5 1981)
("[S]eniority and age discrimination are unrelated .... We state without
equivocation that the seniority a given plaintiff has accumulated entitles him to
no better or worse treatment in an age discrimination suit"), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 943 (1982); EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 942 (CA4 1992)
(emphasizing distinction between employee's age and years of service).
Id.
9. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 608.
10. Id. at 614.
11. For a discussion of the difference between disparate impact and disparate treatment
see infra pt. II.
12. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610.
13. Adams v. Florida Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1323-24 (1 lth Cir. 2001).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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disparate impact claims. This finding was affirmed by the court of
appeals. 16 Although the court of appeals acknowledged that the Supreme
Court had not decided the issue, it found against the plaintiff class because
of a perceived symmetry between the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act
(EPA); 17 the Supreme Court has held that disparate impact claims are not
viable under the EPA.'8  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
subsequently dismissed the claim.' 9 The opinion simply reads, "[t]he writ
of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered.,
20
Even though the facts of these two cases differ and the complaints
alleged different theories of discrimination, the cases are strikingly similar
in that the Supreme Court made it clear that it did not want to decide the
issue of disparate impact theory liability under the ADEA. Consequently,
employees' ability to succeed on a claim under the ADEA is, at least in
part, dependent on the circuit in which they reside.
II. HISTORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT
The terms "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" should not be
conflated, since they denote different legal theories. An understanding of
this difference is fundamental for comprehending the issue of disparate
impact, particularly in its relation to age discrimination. Disparate
treatment focuses on a discriminatory intent.2'
'Disparate treatment' ... is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion [or
other protected characteristics.] Proof of discriminatory motive is
critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the
22mere fact of differences in treatment ....
Conversely, disparate impact rests not on motive but rather on the
consequence of a particular practice.23  "Claims that stress 'disparate
impact' [by contrast] involve employment practices that are facially neutral
in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on
16. Id.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
18. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981) (differentiating
the EPA from Title VII, which does permit disparate impact liability theory).
19. Adams v. Florida Power Corp., 535 U.S. 228 (2002).
20. Id.
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one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof
of discriminatory motive... is not required .... ."24
In 1971, disparate impact first became an issue before the Supreme
25Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company. The discrimination in this case
was racial in nature and the claim was brought under Title VII.26 Black
employees of a generating plant alleged that the employer's requirement of
a high school diploma or the passing of an intelligence test, as a
prerequisite of being hired or transferred within the plant, had a disparate
racial impact.27
It must be noted that the practices and requirements set by the
generating plant were first implemented prior to the passage of Title VII.28
Therefore, the district court held for the employer, stating that Title VII
relief is not retroactive and that the employer was no longer practicing
discriminatory conduct.29 The court of appeals affirmed the holding for the
employer.3 °  Its rationale was that the employer did not have a
discriminatory intent when it implemented the prerequisites, so there was
no violation of Title VII. 3 However, the court of appeals disagreed with
the district court's finding that Title VII precluded claims of residual
32
discrimination.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine the correct
interpretation of Title VII.33 By reviewing the facts of this particular case,
and analyzing the statute, the Court reversed the holdings of the lower
courts.34  It determined that Title VII does not require a finding of
discriminatory intent: "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation., 35 In
this case, the Court found that the requirement of a high school diploma or
passing an intelligence test could not be sustained under Title VII because
there was no correlation between the requirements and an employee's job
performance.36 Title VII does not ban the use of testing mechanisms to
determine eligibility for employment and transfers so long as the testing, or
24. Id.
25. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
27. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
28. Id. at 426-27.






35. Id. at 432.
36. Id. at 433 ("The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and general
testing devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or degrees as fixed measures of
capability.").
HAZEN PAPER Co. REVISITED
other requirements, bears a connection to job performance.37
The appeal to plaintiffs of disparate impact liability is obvious; motive
and intent is something that can be difficult to prove and effects can be
more readily apparent. To prove a prima facie case for disparate impact, a
plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant's actions adversely affected the
plaintiff; (2) that the defendant's facially neutral practice disproportionately
impacts persons of a particular group; and (3) that there is a causal
connection between the disparate impact and the defendant's practices.38
Even after the plaintiff has proven a prima facie case, the defendant still
has a chance to rebut by showing a legitimate and justifiable reason for its
practice (a business necessity). Once the defendant meets its rebuttal
burden, the plaintiff must then establish either that the defendant
overlooked an equally effective alternative with less discriminatory effects
or that the proffered justification is no more than a pretext for
discrimination.39
Since Griggs, successful disparate impact claims have been asserted
for gender based discrimination as well. Dothard v. Rawlinson40 was the
first such Supreme Court case. In Dothard, a female contested Alabama's
statutory weight and height requirements4 for employment as a prison
37. Id. at 436 n.12. The Court clearly limited its rejection of the employer's test in
Griggs:
Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures;
obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices
and mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable
measure of job performance. Congress has not commanded that the less
qualified be preferred over the better qualified simply because of minority
origins. Far from disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made
such qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and
sex become irrelevant. What Congress has commanded is that any tests used
must measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.
Id. at 436.
38. Id. at 431-32 (applying this test to the facts of this case).
39. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (defining this final stage
of the burden shifting process).
40. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
41. The Court in Dothard relied on Alabama Code, Title 55, § 373 (109) (Supp. 1973),
which stated that:
(d) Physical qualifications. - The applicant shall be not less than five feet two
inches nor more than six feet ten inches in height, shall weigh not less than 120
pounds nor more than 300 pounds and shall be certified by a licensed physician
designated as satisfactory by the appointing authority as in good health and
physically fit for the performance of his duties as a law-enforcement officer.
The commission may for good cause shown permit variances from the physical
qualifications prescribed in this subdivision.
20041
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guard. Though facially neutral, she claimed that this requirement
disproportionately and adversely affected women by decreasing the
probability that they would be employed as guards.42 The Court held that
the district court did not err in ruling that Title VII was applicable to
Alabama's statutory requirements.43  It also held that the plaintiff
established a prima facie case which the defendant was unable to rebut.
44
It has been judicially determined that Title VII does in fact allow for
disparate impact liability. Congress passed Title VII for "the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification. 45  These impermissible classifications
include and are limited to "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 'A6
Notably missing from the protected categories listed in Title VII is age.
III. THE ADEA
The ADEA undoubtedly prohibits age discrimination under a
disparate treatment theory. Passed in 1967, the ADEA was an amendment
to the Fair Labor Standards Act.47 Its stated purpose is to ensure that older
workers are not treated unfairly and arbitrarily with respect to
48 4employment. Persons over forty years of age,49 whether employees or
applicants, comprise the class protected by the ADEA. An employer must
have at least twenty employees for its employees to be covered under the
ADEA.50 The ADEA is not only applicable to employers, it also applies to
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 324 n.2.
42. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 321, 324.
43. Id. at 328.
44. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331. The Court stated that:
The plaintiffs in a case such as this are not required to exhaust every possible
source of evidence, if the evidence actually presented on its face conspicuously
demonstrates a job requirement's grossly discriminatory impact. If the
employer discerns fallacies or deficiencies in the data offered by the plaintiff, he
is free to adduce countervailing evidence of his own. In this case no such effort
was made.
Id.
45. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994) ("It is therefore the purpose of this [chapter] to promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment.").
49. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994).
50. The Statute reads:
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512labor organizations," employment agencies,52 and the government.
Under the ADEA, "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."53 It is also
illegal for a labor organization to "exclude or to expel from its membership,
or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his age. 54
An employment agency is prohibited from "refus[ing] to refer for
employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because
of such individual's age, or to classify or refer for employment any
individual on the basis of such individual's age." 5  The "because of'
clauses are indicative of the availability of disparate treatment theory
liability. Courts, including the Supreme Court, universally have allowed
56plaintiffs to assert disparate treatment claims under the ADEA.
The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year: Provided, That
prior to June 30, 1968, employers having fewer than fifty employees shall not be
considered employers. The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and
(2) a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality
of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency, but
such term does not include the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by
the Government of the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994) (emphasis in original).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 630(c) (1994) ("The term 'employment agency' means any person
regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer
and includes an agent of such a person; but shall not include an agency of the United
States").
52. Section 630(d) reads:
The term "labor organization" means a labor organization engaged in an
industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such an organization, and
includes any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representation
committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or
other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, general
committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is
subordinate to a national or international labor organization.
29 U.S.C. § 630(d) (1994).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 623(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 623(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
56. See Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554, 558 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[T]o set
forth a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must ordinarily prove that '(1) the
affected employee was within the protected age group; (2) [he] was doing satisfactory work;
2004]
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IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT
There is currently no national consensus on whether disparate impact
liability theory is a cognizable claim under the ADEA. Most circuits have
aligned themselves on either side of the issue with only the Fourth, Fifth,
and D.C. Circuits still in flux. A majority of circuits preclude disparate
impact theory liability claims under the ADEA; the First, Third, Sixth,
Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have situated themselves on this side
of the split. Only the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits permit disparate
impact liability under the ADEA.
In Mullin v. Raytheon Co.,57 an employee claimed his demotion was a
result of disparate impact. He sued under the ADEA and the Massachusetts
Anti-Discrimination Act.5 8 Mullin had been an employee of the Raytheon
Company for twenty-nine years and had become a manager of
manufacturing operations. 59 This position had a ranking of fifteen on
Raytheon's four to eighteen pay scale. Raytheon then diminished Mullin's
responsibility and subsequently reduced his position ranking to a twelve,
which resulted in a ten percent decrease in his salary.60 The district court
granted Raytheon's motion for summary judgment and it was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.6'
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit took its stance on the issue
of the availability of disparate impact liability under the ADEA in DiBiase
(3) [he] was discharged despite the adequacy of this work; and (4) a younger person
replaced [him]."') (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted); Johnson v.
New York, 49 F.3d 75, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that age must have motivated the
defendant in its decision to fire the plaintiff for plaintiff to succeed on a disparate treatment
claim); Bartek v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., 882 F.2d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[W]here
an employer makes a decision such as termination of an employee because of age, the
employer will or should have known that the conduct violated the [ADEA].") (second
alteration in original) (quoting Dreyer v. Arco Chem. Co., 801 F.2d 651, 658 (3d Cir.
1986)); Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 856-57 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("To make out a prima
facie case of age discrimination against either government or private employers, a plaintiff
must demonstrate facts sufficient to create a reasonable inference that age discrimination
was 'a determining factor' in the employment decision.") (citation omitted); Real v. Cont'l
Group, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 434, 439-40 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("To meet his burden in an age
discrimination case, the plaintiff must prove that age was a determining factor in the
employer's challenged conduct in the sense that 'but for' the discrimination the allegedly
unlawful conduct would not have occurred.") (citation omitted).
57. 164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir. 1999).
58. Id. at 697.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 698.
61. Id. at 704 (holding that "the ADEA does not impose liability under a theory of
disparate impact").
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62v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation. In this case, an employee, DiBiase,
was laid off after SmithKline consolidated four data centers.63 SmithKline
employees who were laid off as a result of the consolidation were given
three months of continued health and dental benefits, as well as one year's
salary.64 However, if employees were willing to sign a release waiving
their right to file suit against SmithKline, the quid pro quo was fifteen
months salary and six months of health and dental benefits.6' DiBiase
refused to sign the release and sued SmithKline, alleging that he was
terminated because of his age." It is important to note that DiBiase's claim
is actually one of disparate treatment. The district court granted DiBiase
summary judgment on his ADEA claim.6 7 Even though DiBase did not
allege a disparate impact claim, the National Employment Lawyers
Association (NELA) submitted an amicus brief urging the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit to consider DiBiase's claim under an
alternative theory, disparate impact." The court reversed the district court
on the disparate treatment claim and speculated that the Supreme Court
would not allow a disparate impact claim to proceed under the ADEA.69
Lyon v. Ohio Education Association, ° is a representative case from
the Sixth Circuit. As in DiBiase, the plaintiffs in this case did not allege a
disparate impact claim.7' Lyon, later joined by sixteen coworkers, sued
both his employer and his union claiming that an early retirement clause in
72the collective bargaining agreement was violative of the ADEA.Although the plaintiffs were not alleging a disparate impact claim, this
62. 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 1995).
63. Id. at 722.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 722-23. DiBiase's complaint actually alleged two counts but only one is
pertinent to this discussion. Id. at 723.
67. Id. at 723.
68. Id. at 730.
69. Id. at 732 ("[I]n the wake of Hazen, it is doubtful that traditional disparate impact
theory is a viable theory of liability under the ADEA.").
70. 53 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1995).
71. Id. at 137.
72. The Collective Bargaining Agreement read:
Upon the earlier of the completion of twenty (20) years of service or the
attainment of age sixty (60) after five (5) years of service, a participant may
elect to retire. Early retirement under this Option B may be elected by the
participant at any time after the participant meets the eligibility
requirement .... Early retirement benefits under this Option B shall be at least
equal to the same percent of salary that the participant would have received if
the participant had retired on the normal retirement date.
Id. at 136 (emphasis and alteration added by the court).
2004]
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court, like its sister in the Third Circuit, read the Supreme Court's decision
in Hazen as a strong indication that disparate impact liability claims are not
cognizable under the ADEA.73
In EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School,7 4 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit weighed in on the debate. This is a case in which the
EEOC sued a school claiming that the school's process for hiring a drama
teacher had a disparate impact on older applicants.75 When the school was
looking to replace a drama teacher who left the school, it was limited in the
salary that it could offer.76 Since the school could only offer a small salary
for the position, it could only hire a teacher who was relatively
inexperienced. 7' Harold Johnson, a sixty-three year old with thirty years of
experience, applied for the opening but the school informed him that he
could not be hired because his experience qualified him for a higher
salary.78 The EEOC filed suit on behalf of Johnson alleging both disparate
treatment and disparate impact under the ADEA.79 In 1992, the Francis W.
Parker School moved for summary judgment and it was denied, but after
the Supreme Court decided Hazen, the Parker school asked the district
court to reconsider the motion in light of Hazen. ° Parker's motion for
summary judgment was granted and the EEOC appealed on the disparate
impact claim.8  The court of appeals held that disparate impact was not a
73. The court in DiBiase provided an instructiv,- discussion of the relationship between
Hazen and the possibility of finding age discrimination under a disparate-impact theory:
There is considerable doubt as to whether a claim of age discrimination may
exist under a disparate-impact theory, and the Court declined to confront the
issue in Hazen Paper. See 113 S. Ct. at 1706 ("we have never decided whether a
disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA... and we
need not do so here"); see also id. at 1710 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]here
are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact
analysis from Title VII to the ADEA."); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 41
F.3d 1073, 1076-78 (7th Cir. 1994). The Court's focus in Hazen Paper on
Congress's intent to prevent discrimination based on inaccurate and damaging
stereotypes suggests that incidental discriminatory effects arising from facially
age-neutral policies are not redressable. However, this circuit has stated that a
disparate-impact theory of age discrimination may be possible. See Abbott v.
Federal Forge, 912 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 139-40 n.5.
74. 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994).
75. Id. at 1075.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The school also informed Johnson that he would not be hired because his
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cognizable claim under the ADEA and therefore is not available in the
Seventh Circuit.
82
The disparate impact on age of weight standards was at issue in Ellis
v. United Airlines, Inc. s3 Plaintiffs applied for jobs as flight attendants at
United Airlines after their previous employer was bankrupted.84  They
claimed that United's refusal to hire them because they were overweight,
85
86had a disparate impact on older applicants. The district court granted
United's motion for summary judgment.87 The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reviewed the appeal and held that disparate impact is not a
liability theory that is available under the ADEA.88
The Eleventh Circuit joined circuits that preclude disparate impact
claims under the ADEA, as evidenced by the its holding in Adams. 9 In all
of these circuit court cases, the courts found for the defendant either after
analyzing the ADEA and finding that it is more analogous to the EPA than
to Title VII, or just by relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Hazen.
Conversely, the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits allow disparate
impact claims under. the ADEA because they find symmetry between the
structure and language of the ADEA and Title VII. They also view Hazen
differently from the circuits that preclude disparate impact claims. Instead
of interpreting the sentence "we have never decided whether a disparate
impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA... and we need not
do so here"9 to mean that claims are not cognizable, they read it literally
and say that since the Supreme Court has not definitively made a ruling on
the issue, disparate impact liability is available to plaintiffs under the
ADEA.
In Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,91 plaintiffs were former pilots of Pan
Am who claimed Delta's method of hiring Pan Am pilots after it took over
Pan Am World Airways' shuttle had a disparate impact on older
employees.92 Although the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld
82. Id. at 1077 ("[T]he ADEA prevents employers from using age as a criterion for
employment decisions. On the other hand, decisions based on criteria which merely tend to
affect workers over the age of forty more adversely than workers under forty are not
prohibited.").
83. 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996).
84. Id. at 1000.
85. The weight standard was based on a weight by height chart. Id. at 1001.
86. Id. at 1000.
87. Id. at 1001.
88. Id. at 1009 ("[Pilaintiffs cannot bring a disparate impact claim under the ADEA.").
89. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325 ("[T]he history of the ADEA differs from the legislative
history of Title VII, which the Supreme Court in Griggs relied on to find a cause of action
for disparate impact.").
90. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610.
91. 119 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1997).
92. Id. at 103.
2004]
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the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant,93 it was
not based on a finding that the ADEA precludes disparate impact claims.
9 4
In fact, the court conceded that disparate impact liability is cognizable, 9s
but ruled for the defendant because the plaintiffs did not meet their
burden.96
Similarly, in Smith v. City of Des Moines,97 the court of appeals
affirmed a district court holding for the defendant, but made it clear that
disparate impact liability was available in the Eighth Circuit.98 Smith
involved a fire captain who was terminated after thirty-three years of
employment for failing to meet the fire department's physical fitness
standard.99 He contended that this physical fitness standard had a disparate
impact on older firefighters.'0 In disparate impact analysis, even if a
plaintiff meets its initial burden of proving a prima facie case, the
defendant can rebut if it proves a business necessity.'0 ' In this case, the
City of Des Moines did just that.1
0 2
The Ninth Circuit completes the trio of circuits that allow disparate
impact liability claims under the ADEA. Frank v. United Airlines'0 3 is
another case involving United's weight requirements for flight
attendants.' 4 Plaintiffs were flight attendants alleging that these standards
93. Id. at 105.
94. Id.
95. Id. ("Although the Supreme Court has never decided whether a disparate impact
theory of liability is available under the ADEA... in our circuit, we have recognized such
an action."); see also District Council 37 v. New York City Dep't of Parks & Recreation,
113 F.3d 347, 352 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[E]mployees can make a primafacie case of disparate
impact by showing that a step in an employment practice had significant disparate impact on
a protected class of which the employee was a member, regardless of whether the bottom
line was discriminatory.").
96. Criley, 119 F.3d at 105 ("[A]n employer's concern about the economic
consequences of employment decisions does not constitute age discrimination under the
ADEA, even though there may be a correlation with age.").
97. 99 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996).
98. Id. at 1469-70 ("We consider first the city's argument, which the District Court
rejected, that a claim of disparate impact is not cognizable under the ADEA... We have on
several occasions applied disparate impact analysis to age discrimination claims...
[D]isparate impact claims under the ADEA are cognizable.").
99. Id. at 1468.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1471.
102. Id. ("We conclude that the city met its burden on the business necessity defense by
supporting its motion with evidence that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not
controverted by evidence sufficient to create a jury issue. On the job-relatedness issue, the
city presented undisputed evidence that a captain is frequently involved in fire suppression
activities when a company arrives at a fire scene and that the captain wears a SCBA under
those circumstances.").
103. 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000).
104. Id. at 847.
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had a disparate impact on gender,'05 under Title VII, and on age, under the
ADEA. 1 6 The district court held for United on both claims, declaring that
disparate impact claims are unrecognized under the ADEA;'0 7 the Ninth
Circuit reversed the judgment.'0 8
V. EPA OR TITLE VII?
The major battleground in the debate over the applicability of
disparate impact liability to the ADEA is whether the ADEA is more
analogous to the EPA or to Title VII. Structurally, the ADEA mirrors Title
VII. Not only are they structurally indistinguishable, but the wording of
the two statutes is almost identical as well. Both the ADEA and Title VII
begin with virtually the same phrase, "[e]mployer practices. It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer ..".."109 Both statutes then
enumerate the types of discrimination that are prohibited. In both, section
(a) addresses unlawful practices by employers; section (b) pertains to
employment agencies; and section (c) applies to labor organizations. 1 In
fact, one of the only major textual differences between the statutes is that
the ADEA is targeted at age discrimination and Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.""'
By contrast, the EPA is not structurally or textually similar to the ADEA.
The text of the EPA is as follows:
(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of
this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which
such employees are employed, between employees on the basis
of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a
rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
105. Id. at 848 ("Between 1980 and 1994, United required female flight attendants to
weigh between 14 and 25 pounds less than their male colleagues of the same height and age.
For example, the maximum weight for a 5'7", 30-year-old woman was 142 pounds, while a
man of the same height and age could weigh up to 161 pounds. A 5'11", 50-year-old
woman could weigh up to 162 pounds, while the limit for a man of the same height and age
was 185 pounds.").
106. Id. at 849.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 856 ("[A] disparate impact claim is cognizable under the ADEA... We
therefore conclude that plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed with their disparate impact
class claim.").
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994), and 29 U.S.C. § 623a (2003) (italicized words found
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responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided,
That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in
violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the
provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any
employee.
(2) No labor organization, or its agents, representing employees
of an employer having employees subject to any provisions of
this section shall cause or attempt to cause such an employer to
discriminate against an employee in violation of paragraph (1) of
this subsection."
2
Examining the plain language and structures of the statutes is not the
only approach taken by commentators on both sides of the issue; both
proponents and opponents of the extension of disparate impact liability to
the ADEA analyze legislative history and intent of the statutes, and the
amendments to Title VII.
As previously stated, those who advocate applying disparate impact
theory to ADEA cases tend to focus on the language of the ADEA."'
Specifically, they point to the similarity between the ADEA and Title VII
since the latter allows disparate impact claims. The Supreme Court has also
noted the similarities. According to the Court, the two statutes "share
common substantive features and also a common purpose: 'the elimination
of discrimination in the workplace.' ' '14 A similar argument is that the two
statutes are analogous because the ADEA was derived from Title VII, and
since disparate impact is available under Title VII, it must be available
under the ADEA." 5 "In Lorillard v. Pons the Court noted the important
similarities between the ADEA and Title VII in both their aims and
substantive prohibitions: '[t]he prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in
haec verba from Title VII.-'1
6
112. 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(1)-(2).
113. See Brett Ira Johnson, Six of One, Half-Dozen of Another: Mullin v. Raytheon Co.
As a Representative of Federal Circuit Courts Erroneously Distinguishing the ADEA from
Title VII Regarding Disparate Impact Liability, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 303, 314 (2000); Jonas
Saunders, Age Discrimination: Disparate Impact Under the ADEA After Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins: Arguments in Favor, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 591, 595-96(1996).
114. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (quoting
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979)).
115. Johnson, supra note 113, at 314.
116. Suzanne M. Boris, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: A Case Study, 58
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Naturally, opponents of ADEA disparate impact claims assert that the
two statutes are merely facially analogous and determining whether
disparate impact claims should be available in ADEA cases, necessitates a
deeper analysis.
Those who argue in favor of extending disparate impact theory to
the ADEA are forced to place a heavy emphasis on the general
similarities between the statutory language of the ADEA and the
language of Title VII. Admittedly, at first glance this is an
appealing argument. Because the ADEA was modeled after Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, both statutes' provisions are
largely identical in wording and purpose."7
While conceding facial similarity, opponents are quick to note
fundamental differences between the acts. These differences, they
maintain, militate against a finding that disparate impact liability should be
available under the ADEA. 1 8 The structural similarity of the statutes might
render them "statutory relatives, . . . [but] does not make them twins. There
indeed are important distinctions between the two statutes which have
precluded the development of completely parallel bodies of case law." 119
One of the differences is that the ADEA contains an exemption where
Title VII does not.
Most of those who argue against applying the disparate impact
theory to the ADEA rely on section 4(f)(1) of the ADEA. That
section creates an exemption making it lawful for an employer to
"take any action ... where the differentiation is based on
reasonable factors other than age." Title VII does not contain any
comparable exemption. "°
Even though Title VII does not have a comparable clause, the EPA
does have such a clause. Since the Supreme Court has precluded disparate
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 877, 880 (1990) (quoting 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
117. Evan H. Pontz, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact Theory
Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REv. 267, 289
(1995).
118. Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1101
n.36 (1993).
119. Id.
120. Douglas C. Herbert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument Against
Applying the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. L. REV.
625, 639 (1996) (quoting 29 U.S.C. 623(f)(1) (1994)).
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impact claims under the EPA,121 opponents of ADEA disparate impact
claims apply the Supreme Court's analysis to the ADEA. "[T]he Court
concluded that the defense was inconsistent with disparate impact cases
and reflected a congressional intent to limit Equal Pay Act claims to
disparate treatment."'
' 22
Another argument, based on statutory language, against the
availability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA is that the ADEA
prohibits employers, agencies, and unions from making employment
decisions "because of' a person's age; the "because of' language, it is
argued, is indicative of the availability of disparate treatment claims. 121
The most obvious reading of the clause, "because of such
individual's age," is that it prohibits an employer from
intentionally treating someone differently based on his or her age.
It would be a stretch to read the phrase "because of such
individual's age" to prohibit incidental and unintentional
discrimination that resulted because of employment decisions
which were made for reasons other than age.124
However, proponents of ADEA disparate impact claims counter with
the language of Title VII, which also includes the "because of' phrase.
Since the Supreme Court has held that disparate impact claims are available
under Title VII, the proponents maintain that the "because of' language
must not preclude disparate impact. 12  Additionally, some commentators
suggest that the ADEA specifically provides for the availability of
disparate impact claims. 26 They support their assertion with the text of the
ADEA, which makes it illegal "to limit, segregate, or classify...
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's age.' 27 Notably, Title
121. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 (1981) (requiring direct
evidence of discriminatory treatment).
122. Herbert & Shelton, supra note 120, at 640.
123. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1007.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Brendan Sweeney, Comment, "Downsizing" the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: The Availability of Disparate Impact Liability, 41 ViLL. L. REV. 1527,
1543-45 (1996).
126. See, e.g., Marla Ziegler, Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1038, 1051-52 (1984) ("The phrase 'adversely affect'
implies that an employment practice can constitute illegal discrimination even if not
intended or directed specifically at age. Thus the phrase not only prohibits intentional age
discrimination but also forbids any policy having a more harmful effect on older people than
on their co-workers.").
127. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (emphasis added).
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VII contains parallel language. 12 For the proponents, "adversely affect" is
synonymous with disparate impact.
The opposing argument, as advanced by Pamela Krop, is that this
reading of the "adversely affect" clause is grammatically incorrect.1
29
According to Krop, the "because of' phrase modifies the phrase "limit,
segregate, or classify," and not the "adverse affect" phrase. 30  Krop
concludes that the statute only outlaws behavior that "limit[s], segregate[s],
or classif[ies]" because of an employee's age.13' This reading is consistent
with the availability of only disparate treatment liability under the ADEA.
The next points of contention are the legislative history and intent of
the statutes. In order to determine legislative intent, Professor Alfred
Blumrosen closely examined Secretary of Labor Wirtz's Report. 12 When
Congress enacted Title VII, it mandated the Report to evaluate the factors
that contribute to age discrimination. 33  Blumrosen argues that in the
Report, the Secretary distinguishes between arbitrary discrimination and
discrimination resulting from "factors which might tend to result in
discrimination."' 13 4  This dichotomy of discrimination, according to
Blumrosen, is equivalent to disparate treatment and disparate impact; the
Report suggested that only the arbitrary age discrimination should be
outlawed.
35
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (making it unlawful "to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin")
(emphasis added).
129. Herbert & Shelton, supra note 120, at 638 (quoting Pamela S. Krop, Age
Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REv. 837, 842-48 (1982)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 643-44.
133. Id. at 643.
134. Id. at 643-44 (quoting Alfred W. Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent or
Impact, in AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: A COMPLIANCE AND LMGATION
MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68, 74 (Monte B. Lake ed., 1982)).
135. Id. at 645 (citing Alfred W. Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent or Impact, in
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR
LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68, 79 (Monte B. Lake ed., 1982).
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The Report did not suggest that institutional practices which had
an "adverse effect" on older workers should be declared illegal.
On the contrary, it recommended that institutional pressures, such
as those arising from pension systems, be eased by special
programs which would not discourage hiring of older workers.
The only practice which the report proposed to declare illegal
was the setting of a specific age limit for hiring or termination in
disregard of individual capacity. Such a practice would have to
136be "intentional" by its nature.
Blumrosen also notes that as opposed to the legislative history of the
Title VII, the legislative history of the ADEA "is replete with statements
that the new Act would outlaw only those employment actions that were
'solely' based on age. From this, he draws further support for his
conclusion that the ADEA does not incorporate the disparate impact
doctrine.''
13 7
Naturally, advocates of the availability of disparate impact claims
under the ADEA respond by asserting that the legislative history of the
ADEA militates in favor of a finding that the statute does not preclude
disparate impact liability. They maintain that the similarity in language
and structure of Title VII and the ADEA is a manifestation of Congress'
intent to offer the same protections against age discrimination that are
available for discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."' 38
During the Senate floor debate on the ADEA, Senator Jacob
Javits described America as a "land where a premium is put on
ability- not rank, not privilege, and, if the system worked to
perfection, not nationality, not religion, not sex, not race, and not
age." In making these statements, Senator Javits, a leading
figure in the adoption of the ADEA, admitted that there were
shortcomings in America's treatment of minorities. These
shortcomings, he added, were addressed by the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which specifically prohibited discrimination on the
ground of race, sex, religion, or national origin. Senator Javits,
noted, however, that "[a]t the time, we all recognized that the act
left untouched another major problem, age discrimination."
Congress's purpose in enacting the ADEA was "to promote
136. Id. (quoting Alfred W. Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent or Impact, in AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR
LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68, 79 (Monte B. Lake ed., 1982).
137. Id. at 645-46 (describing Blumrosen's observation).
138. Boris, supra note 116, at 879-80.
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employment of older persons based on their ability rather than
age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and]
to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment."
39
A second historical argument against the availability of disparate
impact claims under the ADEA has been averred; if Congress intended for
age discrimination in employment to be treated in the same manner as
employment discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin," it would have included age in Title VII. 4° In fact, according to this
argument, Congress contemplated including age in Title VII and elected
instead to mandate the Report.14
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,14' Title VII was
amended to specifically provide for disparate impact liability; Congress
failed to amend the ADEA in this way. The Title VII amendment that
expressly allows disparate impact claims is viewed by both proponents and
opponents of ADEA disparate impact claims as favorable to their
viewpoint.
Those who believe that the ADEA precludes disparate impact claims
assert that Congress' failure to amend the ADEA to include the availability
of such claims shows that Congress intends for the ADEA only to allow
disparate treatment claims. The fact that Congress has amended the ADEA
in other ways 143 is further evidence, "signaling its intent not to provide for a
disparate impact cause of action under the ADEA."' 44
The counterargument is that Congress' inaction should not be
indicative of its intent to preclude disparate impact claims under the
ADEA.
139. Id. at 879-80 (citing 113 CONG. REc. 31,254 (1967)) (alterations in original)
(citations omitted).
140. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 115, at 645 (describing the legislative history of
the ADEA).
141. Id. at 643.
142. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat, 1071 (1991).
143. "Specifically, Congress explicitly added a disparate impact cause of action to Title
VII in the 1991 Civil Rights Act... However, Congress added no such parallel provision to
the ADEA, despite its amendment of other portions of the ADEA .. " Ellis, 73 F.3d at
1008 (internal citations omitted).
144. Id.
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Congress can only create laws by enacting a statute within the
parameters of Article I, Section 7 of the United States
Constitution. Thus, congressional silence cannot be understood
to be an affirmative statement and congressional failure to amend
the ADEA to specifically allow for a disparate impact cause of
action has very little, if any, probative value.
45
A corollary argument is as follows: congressional inaction might, in
fact, be indicative of the availability of disparate impact liability under the
ADEA.' 46 Congress may have thought that there was no need to amend the
ADEA with respect to disparate impact claims because courts have
recognized the availability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA.'
47
"This silence, if any consideration is given to such, could be seen as
acquiescence to the judicial recognition of a disparate impact cause of
action under the ADEA.',
148
VI. SHOULD DISPARATE IMPACT LIABILITY BE AVAILABLE UNDER THE
ADEA?
It is ostensibly quite odd that the Supreme Court not only refused to
decide the issue of availability of disparate impact liability in Adams, but
that it granted certiorari and dismissed the case. In 1981, the Court also
refused to directly resolve this issue in Markham v. Geller.'4 9 But unlike in
Adams, the Court simply denied certiorari in Markham. Additionally, the
opinion in Adams does not provide an explanation for the dismissal. This
leaves much room for academic conjecture.
Although it is easy to be sympathetic to the plight of older employees,
it appears that Congress did not intend for disparate impact liability to be
available under the ADEA. It can even be asserted that Congress did not
specifically intend for Title VII to include disparate impact claims when
Title VII was passed. Disparate impact is not mentioned in Title VII and
became an issue only after Griggs. "Because the ADEA was passed before
Griggs, Congress likely only contemplated a disparate treatment cause of
action in enacting the ADEA."' 5°
However, even if Congress did not contemplate the concrete notion of
disparate impact, the nature and history of discrimination based on race and
145. Brett Ira Johnson, Six of One, Half-Dozen of Another: Mullin v. Raytheon Co. As a
Representative of Federal Circuit Courts Erroneously Distinguishing the ADEA from Title
VII Regarding Disparate Impact Liability, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 303, 332 (2000).
146. Id. at 333.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 451 U.S. 945 (1980).
150. Johnson, supra note 145, at 326.
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gender that Congress sought to remedy is consistent with a finding of
disparate impact liability under Title VII. Unlike with race and gender, age
does not have a history of stigma and de jure barriers. Under an equal
protection analysis, state classifications based on race and gender are
afforded a higher level of scrutiny than classifications based on age.'51
Because age is not immutable, while race ands ex are, the link
between prior discrimination against one in the covered class and
the effects of that discrimination trickling down to others in the
covered class is tenuous at best. In other words, one can at least
see how prior discrimination against blacks may possibly have
served to keep blacks as a group from starting at the same point
as others inthe race for employment. But to say that prior
discrimination against a fifty-year-old had some traceable effect
upon another in the covered class, who was not in the covered
class at the time of the discrimination, does not follow. Thus, no
vestige exists to be corrected.
5 2
The ADEA is undoubtedly similar to Title VII in structure and
wording, but this does not render the two statutes analogous.
The similarities between the two statutes should not overshadow
some significant differences. Unlike Title VII, the ADEA was
not amended so as to provide explicitly for disparate impact
claims by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The ADEA also differs
from Title VII insofar as the ADEA provides for a defense for
employment practices which arebased on "reasonable factors
other than age (RFOA)."''
151. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) ("'[A]ll gender-based
classifications today' warrant 'heightened scrutiny."') (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S.
127, 136 (1994)), Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) ("To give a mandatory preference
to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination
of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."), Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely
because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause."), Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("We conclude that in the field
of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."), and Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[AIll legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect."), with Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) ("Old age also does not define a discrete and insular
minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will experience it.").
152. Kyle C. Barrentine, Disparate Impact and the ADEA: A Means to an End or
Justice?, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 1245, 1268 (1997).
153. Nathan E. Holmes, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: Are
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These are the most persuasive arguments against the availability of
disparate impact liability under the ADEA because they show an
unambiguous demarcation between the ADEA and Title VII. The latter
argument is particularly persuasive. Even a strict constructionist, for whom
legislative history is never part of the analysis, should be persuaded by the
"reasonable factors other than age" clause. The clause clearly differentiates
the ADEA from Title VII. In addition, the clause makes the ADEA more
analogous to the EPA, a statute that the Supreme Court has found precludes
disparate impact claims. Proponents of ADEA disparate impact claims are
forced to concede that this is "[a] potent argument".1 54 Similarly, now that
Title VII has been amended to include disparate impact liability, the
arguments favoring disparate impact under the ADEA that rely on the
symmetry of the statutes are further weakened.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has declined several opportunities to resolve the
issue of the availability of a disparate impact claim under the ADEA and
has given no indication as to when or if it will address the matter. While
the ADEA is similar to Title VII, there are significant differences and these
differences militate in favor of a finding that the ADEA precludes disparate
impact liability. Yet the Court's silence and the dialectical stalemate on the
issue within the academic community emphasize that only Congress
ultimately can resolve this conflict by amending the statute to address the
issue and permanently quell the debate.
Disparate Impact Claims Available?, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 299, 306 (2000).
154. Jonas Saunders, Age Discrimination: Disparate Impact Under the ADEA After
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins: Arguments in Favor, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 591, 604
(1996).
